Sadr Wins! Maliki Loses! Or something like that

The MSM has weighed in on the ceasefire negotiations, and they're handing the match to al-Sadr by virtually unanimous decision (here, here, and here). I know I'm in the minority on this, but Moqtada's increased political acumen aside, you don't bargain with someone you can continue to defy with impunity. By no means is this a blowout win for al-Maliki, but the last round of violence provided exactly the type of situation where al-Sadr would have handily beaten the Prime Minister even a year ago.

Any arrangement where JAM is kept out of the fighting and al-Maliki can retain his independence is a win in the long term for Iraq. While the issue of disarmament will have to be dealt with eventually, the bigger issue is getting al-Sadr to buy into the political process. Once that happens (a big if, to be sure), then disarmament will be a much more surmountable problem. I hope that al-Maliki knew that he just can't disarm the JAM, but wanted to establish a strong position for later compromise (otherwise the PM has been drinking the GI Kool-Aid). Bottom Line: the Iraqi Army is taking baby steps towards standing up to the militias, and the Iraqi Government has survived a potentially devastating situation caused by British negligence in Southern Iraq. Second-guess all you want, but that's far from the serious setback that the media is trumpeting.

EDIT: Abu Aardvark thinks al-Maliki was indeed drinking the Kool-Aid, and he has moved me to agree. Significantly, though, he too sees a long term picture with the possibility of progress. I'll admit to being a little more optimistic about the chances of political cooperation, but I completely concur with the perspective.

JAM cries Uncle

Yes, the number of updates this month has been shameful, but don't count on an immediate onslaught on posts. It could be mid-May before I start really churning out material.

In light of Sadr's pullback in Basra and throughout the country, we really ought to be asking ourselves about the health of the JAM. The Long War Journal provides a surprisingly thorough assessment of JAM losses, arriving at an encouraging estimate of 1.5-2.5 percent attrition over a five-day period. That kind of loss rate is not sustainable, and the JAM knows it.

It seems clear that Sadr is no longer in a position to dictate politics to the Shia community. The move to civil disobedience is as much about conservation of forces as it is about regaining legitimacy. Maliki is fully independent of Sadr (a development which is not getting nearly enough attention in the mass media) and aiming to eliminate JAM as an armed threat to the state. Early reports of Iraqi defections have been officially refuted, and given Sadr's decision, it seems the Iraqi Army maintained cohesion during the recent violence. While a lot of credit should be given to the people negotiated with Sadr, kudos to the US and Iraqi forces for bringing him to the table.

The Weekend Roundup

Time's been in short supply lately, so there's a slight backlog in recent developments. Here's a brief rundown:

On Friday, Muqtada al-Sadr officially extended his unilateral ceasefire by another six months. The announcement did not get a lot of play in the mainstream media, which has chosen to pretend that the surge is the only variable worth discussing. Most Americans probably failed to appreciate the importance of Muqtada's August withdrawal, even though the removal of the Mahdi Army gave the surge forces much-needed room to operate. Al-Sadr's extension keeps the recent Iraqi political momentum (okay, it's a relative term) alive, and also keeps al-Sadr's forces intact until the additional US brigades return home. A lot of hard work went into keeping Muqtada on the sidelines, and now the US and the Iraqi government have six more months to convince him that he should bury the AK for good. The real reckoning with Muqtada al-Sadr is a ways off, but at least he has allowed Petraeus to shore up the struggling Sons of Iraq without major Shia interference.

The New York Times Magazine has a devastating piece on the struggle for one of the nastiest corners of Afghanistan. It manages to capture the limitations of even the best COIN operators and emphasizes the strains placed on soldiers at the company level. (Spoiler: the stop-loss program does not win the Army any good-will.)

The underrated story of the day: Pakistan's accidental worldwide shutdown of Youtube. The explanation of how an act of national censorship went global is a rare look at the way countries seek to restrict the internet and how those same techniques can be applied to cyberwarfare.

The AP wire has news of Pentagon force projections for the summer. After the surge brigades leave, the US will still have 140,000 troops in Iraq, up from 132,000 before the surge. Afghanistan, the poor and increasingly ugly stepsister, will have its allotment of forces raised to 32,000. If the gains in Iraq hold up, expect to hear more and more about the backsliding taking place outside the cozy confines of Kabul.

Secretary Gates is busy conducting F-16 diplomacy with Indonesia. Worried about losing a valuable market in a country receiving millions in military aid, the Bush administration is trying to override Congressional concerns about the country's human rights record and kick-start the process of delivering training and equipment. The US only reestablished military ties in 2005, so the Pentagon is eager to curry favor with their Indonesian counterparts.