Yes, the number of updates this month has been shameful, but don't count on an immediate onslaught on posts. It could be mid-May before I start really churning out material.
In light of Sadr's pullback in Basra and throughout the country, we really ought to be asking ourselves about the health of the JAM. The Long War Journal provides a surprisingly thorough assessment of JAM losses, arriving at an encouraging estimate of 1.5-2.5 percent attrition over a five-day period. That kind of loss rate is not sustainable, and the JAM knows it.
It seems clear that Sadr is no longer in a position to dictate politics to the Shia community. The move to civil disobedience is as much about conservation of forces as it is about regaining legitimacy. Maliki is fully independent of Sadr (a development which is not getting nearly enough attention in the mass media) and aiming to eliminate JAM as an armed threat to the state. Early reports of Iraqi defections have been officially refuted, and given Sadr's decision, it seems the Iraqi Army maintained cohesion during the recent violence. While a lot of credit should be given to the people negotiated with Sadr, kudos to the US and Iraqi forces for bringing him to the table.
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I'm surprised to hear your opinion on this. Does Bill Roggio seriously expect to convince us that a two percent combat loss by insurgents is something the Iraqi govt should celebrate as a victory? Come on. Any 4GW review of this fight ought to show quite the opposite, that the ability of Sadr to hold off Iraqi forces and then force Maliki to come negotiate a cease fire is a clear victory for JAM. Body counts are so 1960s.
Body counts are not important, but force totals are. Given the recent PR problems of al-Sadr's organization and the more prominent role of the Iraqi National Army in combat, it will be harder to replace those losses. I am not convinced that right now the JAM can replace two percent of their force every five days. Granted, I have no statistics on this, but if you have data I'll be more than happy to reconsider my position.
The last time al-Sadr initiated a ceasefire (back in summer 2007) it was because JAM overreached itself in sectarian fighting. I have always believed that al-Sadr does better when fighting Sunnis and Americans, not fellow Shias. As Emma Sky wrote (via Abu Muqawama):
"JAM used to be viewed as the protectors of the Shia, standing up to the “US Occupation”, retaliating against Sunni attacks and revenging the destruction of the Samarra Mosque. However, JAM’s popular support greatly decreased as their reputation became tarnished by criminal behavior, assassination campaigns, and infiltration of government institutions. With a steep reduction in Al-Qa’ida in Iraq violence and anti-Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Sunni efforts, as well as improved ISF capabilities, the Shia population no longer feel they need JAM’s protection."
Two other things: the most recent polls show that the percentage of Iraqis with "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Iraqi Army and National Government stands at 65 and 48 percent, respectively. If those institutions are seen as playing a major part in the offensive (debatable, but certainly more than earlier actions), then it will be hard for the militants to recruit replacements.
Finally, a major previous source of militant strength was the defection of Iraqi Army soldiers. The lack of serious defections appears to indicate that this avenue of militia reinforcement has been closed. Again, this is not a permanent development, but it is a positive one.
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