We should be sceptical that the meeting, in which Mr Sarkozy pressed for a Russian withdrawal from Georgia, will be a lasting success: the last time the French president negotiated with the Russians, he fell victim to Kremlin realpolitik. The Russians ignored the commitment to withdraw, citing technicalities in the agreement.
We should also be concerned, moreover, that we are leaving a vital part of Britain's foreign (and energy security) policy to Mr Sarkozy; he may have many virtues but his foreign policy interests are not necessarily identical to our own.
Who knows what Franco-Russian deals he may be contemplating? From the EU's perspective, these negotiations are less about Georgia and more about seeking to build credibility as an international power broker.
Yet, without an army, navy and airforce, aggressors are never going to take an EU foreign policy seriously; and, while the europhiles would see that as an argument for an EU military arm, that would be a recipe for factionalism.
There will be a temptation, after the inevitable European humiliation, to pass the buck to other supranational institutions such as the G8 and the United Nations. This would be a mistake.
The world has returned to 19th Century-style great power struggles between nation states, uninhibited by international institutions. With a risk that Russian will impose its will on other neighbours such as Ukraine in the future, we cannot rely on impotent organisations to keep the peace.
Instead, it requires politicians here and the United States to wake up to their own national interests and take a tough line against Russian expansionism, which will be discouraged not by soft power but by strength.
Beyond the slightly paranoid fears about French double-dealing, the editorial betrays a conservative belief that Russia's actions have shown the irrelevance of international controls and the ephemeral nature of the post-Cold War cooperative atmosphere. The conviction that Russia cannot be reasoned with or politely diverted from its aims points to a return to Cold War thinking. The thrust of the editorial is that Europe has placed too much faith in its political and economic collective without investing in the hard power resources to rebuff Russia's regional imperialism. In the face of Russia's efforts to reassert its traditional sphere of influence encompassing recalcitrant polities such as Georgia and Ukraine, the Europeans have found themselves over the literal and metaphorical barrel (of oil). Now that Georgia's section of the BTC pipeline is vulnerable to further Russian intervention, Russia's hand is even stronger.
Have we indeed returned to the 19th century? I refuse to believe that the situation is so simple as that. Even if the EU and UN are powerless, Russia's power is entirely dependent on the price of energy and the willingness of multi-nationals to do business with an unstable and corrupt regime. In twenty or thirty years, alternative energy sources might relegate Russia to second-rate status yet again. Until then, we may have to consider a piece of history that the Daily Telegraph did not mention. I'm sure there are a few copies of "Article X" floating around, just waiting to be updated for a xenophobic petro-state.
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