Today is the first day in the blogosphere without Andrew Exum and his contributions to the incisive and entertaining domain of Abu Muqawama. In just a year and a half, the site has become the best COIN-centric civilian blog on the web, and makes a strong case for best civilian blog anywhere for military affairs.
In reading the flood of comments following Exum's departure, I was surprised to find out just how many readers have joined in recent months. I first encountered the blog last October and still consider myself a relative latecomer, but as Exum himself noted, the readership growth has been "exponential". Perhaps the greatest testament to the strength of the site's commentary is the diversity of the current audience . Mothers of servicemen, ROTC cadets, active duty US officers, foreign scholars, amateur civilian analysts...all of them have found AM to be intelligent and accessible. That diversity is what separates Abu Muqawama from narrower sites such as the excellent but military-dominated Small Wars Journal and the exclusive Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard. Rather than confine debate to credentialed experts, AM has opened its doors to the masses, and the resulting dialogue has created a strong community that should continue to thrive.
Andrew Exum may have left Abu Muqawama to further his academic career, but the blog may become his greatest legacy. There is a revolution underway in public discourse, with issues of national strategy being debated by an active and informed virtual community. Bloggers have been electronically recording their opinions for some time now, but we are beginning to see devoted followings coalesce around the best sites. Abu Muqawama is at the leading edge of that trend, and as more people are drawn into the grand discussion, impassioned arguments from below will meet receptive policymakers from above. The revolution has just begun, and many people have lined up to resist change (I'm looking at you, Air Force), but the elitist circles of national security are under siege. So thank you Andrew Exum, for taking an inside joke way too far and giving life to Abu Muqawama.
And to Erin Simpson, the new Chief of Blogging Operations: Welcome. We can't wait to see how you build upon Exum's work. Abu Muqawama will remain in good hands.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Chicagoland COIN
Americans have a deep-seated fear of involving the military in public life. In a time when even recruiters for a volunteer military are targeted by domestic protesters, it is difficult to contemplate importing concepts and techniques from a military involved in an unpopular occupation of a foreign country. The disjunct between the military and the civilian population has never been greater, with consequences for both civil-military relations and the health of American society.
During the 2000 election, the Bush campaign renounced "nation-building" as a role for the US military. The results of the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the US to reluctantly shoulder the responsibility of (re)building those nations, and the weaknesses of national governments throughout the world will dictate future requirements for a robust nation-building capability. Questions are being asked, particularly about the health of the foreign advising program. Bureaucratic recognition the institutional importance of advising is still in doubt, as is the military's ability to interface with both American and host nation civilian departments. A full spectrum nation-building program is still a ways off, but progress is being (fitfully) made.
A curious dynamic has developed through the military adventures of the twenty-first century. The armed services, long a xenophobic, conservative, and isolated community, have experienced a cultural enlightenment at the grassroots. An entire generation of soldiers and sailors (maybe even a few airmen) have been exposed to the diverse social and cultural landscape of the world beyond the American bubble. Servicemen have acquired painful firsthand knowledge of the expanded range of obstacles to national strength and unity, including social and economic inequities as well as political, ethnic, and sectarian fault lines. Having been forced to "reverse engineer" new governments and reinforce existing one, the armed forces are producing rudimentary public administrators as well as warfighters.
All of this stands in sharp contrast to the state of public administration at home. While critics have focused their attention on the qualities and shortcomings of high ranking officials, critical attention to state and local governance - the levels where the military has had the most success - has been lacking. Even the most rudimentary security concerns of domestic crime have been ignored during a wide-ranging presidential campaign. The GWOT/Long War has stripped away funds for social programs everywhere, from police officers to daycares. So far, America's foreign experiences have done nothing to improve its "domestic tranquility".
As writers such as John Robb have concluded, the true challenge facing modern societies is the construction of resilient communities, not national bureaucratic monstrosities. If we choose to view the United States as a patchwork of communities rather than a single nation, then our vulnerabilities become more apparent. The most dysfunctional and unstable communities hamstring our economic and social growth by perpetuating inequity and wasting national resources. These communities are concentrated in impoverished urban centers, and they demand a holistic solution that has not been forthcoming. Sporadic efforts to address urban poverty have produced mixed and sometimes counterproductive results.
These urban pockets are not ruled by the legitimate authorities that govern the rest of the country. Through a combination of inadequate resources, misplaced priorities, and corruption, state and local governments have relinquished their claims to troublesome urban enclaves. The abandoned communities have since become semi-sovereign entities, with their own power-sharing arrangements, economies, and social structures. Although individuals and organizations in these enclaves once subverted legitimate authority, it was ultimately he government's decision to abandon them. Therefore, the situation cannot be properly termed an insurgency. Technical definitions aside, enclaves exist within the nation's physical borders yet outside its legitimate authority. If the government is to reclaim the "ghetto center", it much learn from previous counterinsurgency experiences.
There are some striking similarities between American urban life and foreign environments. In Afghanistan, we have encountered the difficulties of confronting the drug trade and those who subsist on its revenue. We have also learned the value of infrastructure improvements in improving popular support and building community empowerment. In Iraq, we have grappled with the difficulty of transferring the loyalty of urban slums and providing basic government services. In both countries, we have been forced to work across massive social, cultural, and linguistic gaps.
Many of the characters we have dealt with during our occupations have counterparts in our domestic landscape. Comparisons have been made between the Sons of Iraq and the Italian mafia; many urban gangs have consciously adopted the business and organizational model of the mafia. The unique role of black preachers, who are active in the spheres of culture and politics as well as religion, is the closest approximation to the all-purpose influence exerted by certain Muslim religious figures. (are Jeremiah Wright and Muqtada al-Sadr really that far apart?)
If we make the required investment, our chances of success will be much greater in Chicago than in Baghdad. The cultural gap between the ghetto and suburbia is serious, but not as overwhelming as in Sadr city, and the linguistic barrier disappears entirely. Ethnic and sectarian tensions are significantly lower in America's cities, and organized alternatives to government control have not entrenched themselves. We will not have to contend with porous borders or a neighboring regime's patronage of rebellious elements, nor will we have to contend with overextended supply lines. Best of all, we will not face a nationalist insurgency bent on the eviction of foreign invaders.
We will not enter these enclaves without information. While the Pentagon struggles to drum up support for research in the social sciences, anthropologists and sociologists like Sudhir Venkatesh have produced a considerable body of work to form a foundation of knowledge. Even an elementary appreciation of the environment and primary actors will ease the learning curve and give officials a better delineation between what they know, what they don't know, and what they need to know.
To reclaim and reintegrate these urban enclaves, a massive influx of manpower and funds is paramount. One of the fundamental shortcomings of the urban center has been the lack of men to police it; by using recommended COIN force ratios, we can rectify that problem. The additional men will need to come from local and state police, backed by national guard units, preferably those with GWOT experience. Regular army units may be employed to train the new units, but under no circumstance should soldiers be employed in community security outside their home state. The primary task of these additional forces would be to deter gang activity and petty crime, with an eye towards separating the criminal command element from its lower ranks.
Once basic security has been established, infrastructural investments can begin. Three critical areas - housing, schools, and public transportation - should receive priority. Innovation should be encouraged in order to draw the best architects, urban planners, and administrators. Beyond infrastructure, however, human capital will have to be stockpiled, in the form of education and entrepreneurship. The vast underground economy will have to be regulated, with the illicit section gradually phased out as conditions permit and the legal unregulated businesses slowly integrated into the larger economy. The workforce will have to be gradually shaped to survive in the increasingly competitive global marketplace, without crippling the fragile social fabric of the communities.
The time frame for the transformation will need to be extensive, more in line with traditional COIN campaigns than election-driven four year cycles. Even with a full investment and sufficient political will, it may take a decade to secure gains made in these communities. The federal government will need to take the lead until reliable state and local partners can take over; the political machines of major cities have been one of the biggest historical obstacles to urban renewal.
With domestic COIN projects underway, government officials will have a testing ground for population-centric strategies with potential military applications, while the armed forces will have more time to maintain its proficiency in high intensity conflict. The benefits of stable communities will eventually pay for the considerable expenses of reclamation, creating a beneficial investment cycle. Most importantly, the experiences of Americans abroad will be leveraged to strengthen the nation at home. Chicagoland COIN can bridge the gap between America's nascent organizational capabilities and its lingering social needs. For millions of Americans, there is simply no alternative.
This is admittedly a very ambitious and far-reaching concept; expect this post to be edited and revisited in the near future. As always, constructive criticism is welcomed.
During the 2000 election, the Bush campaign renounced "nation-building" as a role for the US military. The results of the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the US to reluctantly shoulder the responsibility of (re)building those nations, and the weaknesses of national governments throughout the world will dictate future requirements for a robust nation-building capability. Questions are being asked, particularly about the health of the foreign advising program. Bureaucratic recognition the institutional importance of advising is still in doubt, as is the military's ability to interface with both American and host nation civilian departments. A full spectrum nation-building program is still a ways off, but progress is being (fitfully) made.
A curious dynamic has developed through the military adventures of the twenty-first century. The armed services, long a xenophobic, conservative, and isolated community, have experienced a cultural enlightenment at the grassroots. An entire generation of soldiers and sailors (maybe even a few airmen) have been exposed to the diverse social and cultural landscape of the world beyond the American bubble. Servicemen have acquired painful firsthand knowledge of the expanded range of obstacles to national strength and unity, including social and economic inequities as well as political, ethnic, and sectarian fault lines. Having been forced to "reverse engineer" new governments and reinforce existing one, the armed forces are producing rudimentary public administrators as well as warfighters.
All of this stands in sharp contrast to the state of public administration at home. While critics have focused their attention on the qualities and shortcomings of high ranking officials, critical attention to state and local governance - the levels where the military has had the most success - has been lacking. Even the most rudimentary security concerns of domestic crime have been ignored during a wide-ranging presidential campaign. The GWOT/Long War has stripped away funds for social programs everywhere, from police officers to daycares. So far, America's foreign experiences have done nothing to improve its "domestic tranquility".
As writers such as John Robb have concluded, the true challenge facing modern societies is the construction of resilient communities, not national bureaucratic monstrosities. If we choose to view the United States as a patchwork of communities rather than a single nation, then our vulnerabilities become more apparent. The most dysfunctional and unstable communities hamstring our economic and social growth by perpetuating inequity and wasting national resources. These communities are concentrated in impoverished urban centers, and they demand a holistic solution that has not been forthcoming. Sporadic efforts to address urban poverty have produced mixed and sometimes counterproductive results.
These urban pockets are not ruled by the legitimate authorities that govern the rest of the country. Through a combination of inadequate resources, misplaced priorities, and corruption, state and local governments have relinquished their claims to troublesome urban enclaves. The abandoned communities have since become semi-sovereign entities, with their own power-sharing arrangements, economies, and social structures. Although individuals and organizations in these enclaves once subverted legitimate authority, it was ultimately he government's decision to abandon them. Therefore, the situation cannot be properly termed an insurgency. Technical definitions aside, enclaves exist within the nation's physical borders yet outside its legitimate authority. If the government is to reclaim the "ghetto center", it much learn from previous counterinsurgency experiences.
There are some striking similarities between American urban life and foreign environments. In Afghanistan, we have encountered the difficulties of confronting the drug trade and those who subsist on its revenue. We have also learned the value of infrastructure improvements in improving popular support and building community empowerment. In Iraq, we have grappled with the difficulty of transferring the loyalty of urban slums and providing basic government services. In both countries, we have been forced to work across massive social, cultural, and linguistic gaps.
Many of the characters we have dealt with during our occupations have counterparts in our domestic landscape. Comparisons have been made between the Sons of Iraq and the Italian mafia; many urban gangs have consciously adopted the business and organizational model of the mafia. The unique role of black preachers, who are active in the spheres of culture and politics as well as religion, is the closest approximation to the all-purpose influence exerted by certain Muslim religious figures. (are Jeremiah Wright and Muqtada al-Sadr really that far apart?)
If we make the required investment, our chances of success will be much greater in Chicago than in Baghdad. The cultural gap between the ghetto and suburbia is serious, but not as overwhelming as in Sadr city, and the linguistic barrier disappears entirely. Ethnic and sectarian tensions are significantly lower in America's cities, and organized alternatives to government control have not entrenched themselves. We will not have to contend with porous borders or a neighboring regime's patronage of rebellious elements, nor will we have to contend with overextended supply lines. Best of all, we will not face a nationalist insurgency bent on the eviction of foreign invaders.
We will not enter these enclaves without information. While the Pentagon struggles to drum up support for research in the social sciences, anthropologists and sociologists like Sudhir Venkatesh have produced a considerable body of work to form a foundation of knowledge. Even an elementary appreciation of the environment and primary actors will ease the learning curve and give officials a better delineation between what they know, what they don't know, and what they need to know.
To reclaim and reintegrate these urban enclaves, a massive influx of manpower and funds is paramount. One of the fundamental shortcomings of the urban center has been the lack of men to police it; by using recommended COIN force ratios, we can rectify that problem. The additional men will need to come from local and state police, backed by national guard units, preferably those with GWOT experience. Regular army units may be employed to train the new units, but under no circumstance should soldiers be employed in community security outside their home state. The primary task of these additional forces would be to deter gang activity and petty crime, with an eye towards separating the criminal command element from its lower ranks.
Once basic security has been established, infrastructural investments can begin. Three critical areas - housing, schools, and public transportation - should receive priority. Innovation should be encouraged in order to draw the best architects, urban planners, and administrators. Beyond infrastructure, however, human capital will have to be stockpiled, in the form of education and entrepreneurship. The vast underground economy will have to be regulated, with the illicit section gradually phased out as conditions permit and the legal unregulated businesses slowly integrated into the larger economy. The workforce will have to be gradually shaped to survive in the increasingly competitive global marketplace, without crippling the fragile social fabric of the communities.
The time frame for the transformation will need to be extensive, more in line with traditional COIN campaigns than election-driven four year cycles. Even with a full investment and sufficient political will, it may take a decade to secure gains made in these communities. The federal government will need to take the lead until reliable state and local partners can take over; the political machines of major cities have been one of the biggest historical obstacles to urban renewal.
With domestic COIN projects underway, government officials will have a testing ground for population-centric strategies with potential military applications, while the armed forces will have more time to maintain its proficiency in high intensity conflict. The benefits of stable communities will eventually pay for the considerable expenses of reclamation, creating a beneficial investment cycle. Most importantly, the experiences of Americans abroad will be leveraged to strengthen the nation at home. Chicagoland COIN can bridge the gap between America's nascent organizational capabilities and its lingering social needs. For millions of Americans, there is simply no alternative.
This is admittedly a very ambitious and far-reaching concept; expect this post to be edited and revisited in the near future. As always, constructive criticism is welcomed.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
A Higher Class of Propaganda (Threats to Air Supremacy)
Watch the rest of the video here.
Kudos to the AFA for turning out such a well-produced segment. Even though it's a blatant attempt to justify additional F-22 production, the threat assessments presented were very accessible and convincing. The video did a particularly smart job of emphasizing the proliferation of these air denial systems while using the Taiwan Straits as a primary scenario illustration (a clever sleigh of hand).
F-22 production aside (and I'm a bit torn on that point), my reaction to this video is to emphasize the value of ECM, Allied SAM technology, and UCAVs. The impetus to control program goals and spending has never been greater.
Perhaps, though, the modern challenge is one of personal influence. Those legacy fighters rendered obsolete in the AFA video owed their era of dominance to organizational renegades like the late Colonel John Boyd. We don't need a next generation of fighters as badly as we need a new generation of men to guide their development.
Friday, May 23, 2008
In Case You Were Wondering...
The head of Northrop Grumman believes his company's contract for the new Air Force KC-45 tanker should be upheld. I'm not surprised to see this PR push in light of all the political posturing, but it's a little disappointing that the LA Times has given Northrop Grumman this type of platform. Granted, at least some pundits at the paper have always favored the Airbus/Northrop Grumman offer over Boeing's planes. Don't be surprised if Boeing fires back in another major publication, either directly or through a Congressional lacky. The GAO isn't required to report a decision until June 19; that leaves plenty of time for more congressional-military-industrial propaganda.
On a less serious note, Danger Room is soliciting names for the prospective tanker.
On a less serious note, Danger Room is soliciting names for the prospective tanker.
Utter Garbage
I expect much better from John Nagl than this piece of refuse he "co-authored" with Chief Neanderthal Charles Dunlap. Unless Dunlap forced Nagl to write at gunpoint (possibly) I have lost some respect for the gentleman who inspired the name of this blog. This is precisely the type of cheerleading, self-congratulatory generalization that leads to eventual defeat. Mixed metaphors, overzealous allusions and an entirely gratuitous plug for free market systems make the lack of concrete assessments and prescriptions all the more obvious. What was the point of this essay, other than create a superficial display of unity?
A conspiratorial reader might sense DoD involvement, with an eye towards papering over any disagreements and trying to work up enthusiasm for the Department's future:
A conspiratorial reader might sense DoD involvement, with an eye towards papering over any disagreements and trying to work up enthusiasm for the Department's future:
The finest military leaders want, indeed, demand, that differing ideas be ruthlessly explored. They expect and encourage vigorous debates. Can that process go awry? Sure. When it devolves into personal attacks and gets mired in finger-pointing, progress ceases. Accountability for the past may have its place, but it is vastly more important to look to the future. The stakes are too just too high.
Looking to the future is what took place at Carlisle. The American way of war is renewing itself. Our most powerful weapon - the competitive analysis of security issues by America’s military - is taking the field. Our enemies ought to beware. And update their wills.
Bottom Line: love letters to Milton Friedman and the armed forces should be confined to personal diaries - they do not substitute for real organizational progressWednesday, May 21, 2008
A Tom Clancy Connection?
I was looking through some of the non-fiction titles written by Tom Clancy (whose fiction has dropped off lately), when I noticed something from the 1999 book Carrier. As part of his book, Clancy joined a CVBG during a fleet exercise. At the time, that CVBG was commanded by Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Michael Mullen, who of course is now the JCS Chairman.
What really makes this curious is the fact that Mullen is not the only military officer to make a cameo in Clancy's work before reaching higher command. While commanding a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, David Petraeus was featured in Clancy's 1997 book Airborne. Going back even further, H.R. McMaster was interviewed for his role in the Battle of 73 Easting for the 1994 book Armored Cav.
Any ideas as to why Clancy keeps running into these guys before the general public? Has he been getting leads and recommendations from within the services, or is he just lucky?
What really makes this curious is the fact that Mullen is not the only military officer to make a cameo in Clancy's work before reaching higher command. While commanding a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, David Petraeus was featured in Clancy's 1997 book Airborne. Going back even further, H.R. McMaster was interviewed for his role in the Battle of 73 Easting for the 1994 book Armored Cav.
Any ideas as to why Clancy keeps running into these guys before the general public? Has he been getting leads and recommendations from within the services, or is he just lucky?
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Resilient Communities and Urban Renewal
I don't quite have the proper practical or theoretical background to put this article about urban decline in perspective, but aside from being a great piece of journalism, it seems to hint at John Robb's Resilient Communities (a concept that doubles as the title of his upcoming book).
A second conclusion is that many of the current political structures and leaders are either unable or unwilling to deal with these new realities. When you find the exceptions, like a reluctantly persuaded but then fully committed Mayor Ed Koch or a housing commissioner like Felice Michetti, fine. But waiting for most to act or blaming them when they don’t are often not constructive responses. This puts the burden of thinking and acting back on a new type of civic leader: a volunteer with a real following in a local community, but also with a range of analysis and understanding that crosses town or county or city boundaries. The renewal of most of the failed cities of the failed state of Ohio—Dayton, Toledo, Cleveland, Youngstown, Sandusky, Lorain, and many others—depends on men and women who live in and care about those cities. But they will need to relate to leaders well beyond their own towns. And they will need to become a kind of ad hoc economic strategy team for their area, for their state, and for the struggling midwestern region described in Richard Longworth’s fine book, Caught in the Middle.
Also significant (at least for my purposes) is the article's focus on Chicago's poor governance and the struggle of Chicagoland communities. The comparison with New York's community-based resurgence is stark and unflattering.Friday, May 16, 2008
The not-so-great generation
Since high school and college graduation ceremonies are well underway, I thought it'd be a good time to provide a quotation from Rick Atkinson's excellent history of the WW2 Italian Campaign, Day of Battle:
of the 683 graduates from the Princeton University class of 1942, 84 percent were in uniform, and those serving as enlisted men included the valedictorian and salutatorian. Twenty-five classmates would die during the war, including nineteen killed in combat.
Contrast that with Princeton graduating class, which is expected to send two graduates to the Army - unless someone outside of ROTC volunteers. This isn't a shot at Princeton, though - at least the college actually has an ROTC, unlike other Ivy League schools. It's funny how Harvard didn't mind segregated units back in the day, yet the inability to be openly gay is grounds to ban ROTC. I'm so glad institutions like that are the pinnacle of civilian achievement in this country.
Meanwhile, some continue to carry the banner of real public service, like 2005 Princeton salutatorian Graham Phillips, who did join the Army - as an enlisted man. That kind of humility and duty is desperately needed in a time of war where college "service" has become a euphemism for trash collection and dance marathons.
of the 683 graduates from the Princeton University class of 1942, 84 percent were in uniform, and those serving as enlisted men included the valedictorian and salutatorian. Twenty-five classmates would die during the war, including nineteen killed in combat.
Contrast that with Princeton graduating class, which is expected to send two graduates to the Army - unless someone outside of ROTC volunteers. This isn't a shot at Princeton, though - at least the college actually has an ROTC, unlike other Ivy League schools. It's funny how Harvard didn't mind segregated units back in the day, yet the inability to be openly gay is grounds to ban ROTC. I'm so glad institutions like that are the pinnacle of civilian achievement in this country.
Meanwhile, some continue to carry the banner of real public service, like 2005 Princeton salutatorian Graham Phillips, who did join the Army - as an enlisted man. That kind of humility and duty is desperately needed in a time of war where college "service" has become a euphemism for trash collection and dance marathons.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Grand Theft Auto Hints at Something More
When is a video game something more? When its lack of political correctness allows it to look past the conventional wisdom.
That is the main thrust of Sudhir Venkatesh's assessment of Grand Theft Auto IV, the latest installment of one of the most controversial video game franchises in history. GTA IV has received excellent reviews from nearly every gaming magazine, but Venkatesh isn't concerned with graphics or gameplay. Instead, Venkatesh (a sociologist at Columbia University) compared the game's portrayal of human networks to the reality of life on Chicago's Southside. His conclusions are striking enough that they deserve to be quoted at length:
This may sound strange, but I found that Grand Theft Auto actually offered a less sensational portrait of gangland and ghetto streets than the one put out by most cops, politicians, policymakers, and even academics. There is nuance in the game that exceeds most of the conventional portraits of American cities; the game goes beyond a black-and-white tale of innocent law abiders fending off the obnoxious criminals. Not that I'm suggesting that we turn to GTA IV to solve the gang problem or that we should we make it required viewing in our high schools. The game is a carnival of violence, deceit, and cruelty that makes you slightly nauseated after playing for only a few hours—I had to periodically rest and play a Neil Diamond song just to calm down. But I have to admit that I was surprised a video game had such a well-developed, fine-grained understanding of human nature.
Venkatesh has become something of a celebrity in sociology circles for the dramatic nature of his written work and the public attention he has received (he was recently interviewed on the Colbert Report for his last book, Gang Leader For a Day). Much of this can be attributed to Venkatesh's ability to free his subject from dry academic rhetoric and offer a richer ethnographic narrative. This approach has enhanced the understanding of the complex and conflicting relationships that underpin daily life in poor urban areas.
I've read quite a bit of Venkatesh's work lately (see his other mentions by Slate here and here) and I believe that his work leads to a new option for public policy. There's a pressing need for a new innovative approach to poverty alleviation within US borders, and traditional programs of purely domestic origin have failed. If America can muster the political will, though, and overcome some deep-seated cultural fears, there may be a way to apply recent government experiences and integrate these urban enclaves into the mainstream of American society.
...But all that will have to wait for another post
That is the main thrust of Sudhir Venkatesh's assessment of Grand Theft Auto IV, the latest installment of one of the most controversial video game franchises in history. GTA IV has received excellent reviews from nearly every gaming magazine, but Venkatesh isn't concerned with graphics or gameplay. Instead, Venkatesh (a sociologist at Columbia University) compared the game's portrayal of human networks to the reality of life on Chicago's Southside. His conclusions are striking enough that they deserve to be quoted at length:
This may sound strange, but I found that Grand Theft Auto actually offered a less sensational portrait of gangland and ghetto streets than the one put out by most cops, politicians, policymakers, and even academics. There is nuance in the game that exceeds most of the conventional portraits of American cities; the game goes beyond a black-and-white tale of innocent law abiders fending off the obnoxious criminals. Not that I'm suggesting that we turn to GTA IV to solve the gang problem or that we should we make it required viewing in our high schools. The game is a carnival of violence, deceit, and cruelty that makes you slightly nauseated after playing for only a few hours—I had to periodically rest and play a Neil Diamond song just to calm down. But I have to admit that I was surprised a video game had such a well-developed, fine-grained understanding of human nature.
The game's success can be traced to a simple principle: Niko Bellic, the protagonist who roams around Liberty City, making his way in the world by building relationships. Even in a city dominated by warring gangs and unjustifiable carnage, people have to find ways to work together not only to commit crimes but to resolve disputes, respond to injustice, and otherwise fulfill their assigned missions. As you move the dashing Niko through beautifully rendered streets, you build up his network of friends and comrades. Of course, in the exploitative terrain of the black market, you can't trust anyone for long; this is one of the key challenges that animate GTA IV. But the point is that a lone wolf can't survive. Niko has to take a risk and trust somebody.
Even the criminals must follow this rule. In the real Big Apple, the local gangs are made up of self-interested mercenaries who move about as money and circumstances dictate. A Jamaican "posse" may control one project one day, but they'll move over a few blocks if the money is right. A gang member might also become a turncoat and join another outfit, even one run by a former adversary. In other words, free agents abound on Wall Street and ghetto streets. GTA IV's Liberty City gets this fluidity of enmity and alliance exactly right. A friend can become a foe; a gang member can turn on you; an ally is never to be trusted for too long. You can't do it alone, and the game forces you to make your bets.
Here, we can clearly Venkatesh is asserting the primacy of human networks in the impoverished inner city. These networks are highly susceptible to both positive and negative incentives, with fluid power structures and alliances. The social structure of these environments is semi-autonomous and often has few points of direct contact with the established, "legitimate" local authorities and greater society.Venkatesh has become something of a celebrity in sociology circles for the dramatic nature of his written work and the public attention he has received (he was recently interviewed on the Colbert Report for his last book, Gang Leader For a Day). Much of this can be attributed to Venkatesh's ability to free his subject from dry academic rhetoric and offer a richer ethnographic narrative. This approach has enhanced the understanding of the complex and conflicting relationships that underpin daily life in poor urban areas.
I've read quite a bit of Venkatesh's work lately (see his other mentions by Slate here and here) and I believe that his work leads to a new option for public policy. There's a pressing need for a new innovative approach to poverty alleviation within US borders, and traditional programs of purely domestic origin have failed. If America can muster the political will, though, and overcome some deep-seated cultural fears, there may be a way to apply recent government experiences and integrate these urban enclaves into the mainstream of American society.
...But all that will have to wait for another post
Israeli Idiocy
The saddest aspect of this AP piece is its brevity - the expansion of West Bank settlements, even at the start of a new diplomatic effort, barely merits a couple of paragraphs. Larger criticisms of Israel aside (and I have several), the timing of this announcement reveals Israel's disdain for the entire peace process. The US needs to start holding Israel accountable for these types of provocations, and I'm not talking about pro forma public statements. We ought to be considering the returns we're receiving from our annual $3 billion investment in the Israeli military. It certainly hasn't raised our standing in the region.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
New Passengers on the AAC Advocacy Train
Westhawk has been keeping an eye on US military advisory missions, noting both the renewed hiring of contractors for Iraq and the overstretched optempo of SOCOM. The former has been commented on by others, but yesterday one of the most prominent critics of Private Military Companies weighed in on the situation.
Peter Singer has been kept busy ever since he published Corporate Warriors, one of the first academic works about the PMC phenomenon (I listened to him give a talk on the issue just two months ago). Singer's opposition to the inclusion of contractors is no surprise, but his voice still carries considerable weight (given Democratic ties to the Brookings Institution, among other things).
Translated from bureaucratic-speak, the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
The real eye-opener, though, is at the end of the piece, where Singer mentions a certain LTC...
It is completely understandable why a hard-pressed force would contemplate contracting out advising the Iraq military. From a bureaucratic standpoint, it’s the easy way out. Despite repeated calls by such top military thinkers as Colonel John Nagl, the U.S. Army still does not have an official advising capacity. Advising has never been something “Big Army” has been all that interested in doing (it has traditionally been viewed as a career drag) and moving officers and NCOs into these roles would mean moving them out of other units. By contrast, all the muss and fuss can instead be handed off to a company to handle.
But just because a company can do the job, doesn’t always mean it should. Advising the Iraqi Army has been determined by our national leadership as a task that is essential to our successful war effort. We should treat it that way in how the job is executed.
Now, numerous bloggers have mentioned the Advisory Corps (Westhawk has given it a plug on both his posts), but I can't recall Singer getting involved before. This is yet another indication that the Army Advisory Corps is gaining traction, and a sign that others are beginning to recognize the hole that the AAC will attempt to fill. It seems Nagl will get his Corps sooner, rather than later.
Peter Singer has been kept busy ever since he published Corporate Warriors, one of the first academic works about the PMC phenomenon (I listened to him give a talk on the issue just two months ago). Singer's opposition to the inclusion of contractors is no surprise, but his voice still carries considerable weight (given Democratic ties to the Brookings Institution, among other things).
Translated from bureaucratic-speak, the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
The real eye-opener, though, is at the end of the piece, where Singer mentions a certain LTC...
It is completely understandable why a hard-pressed force would contemplate contracting out advising the Iraq military. From a bureaucratic standpoint, it’s the easy way out. Despite repeated calls by such top military thinkers as Colonel John Nagl, the U.S. Army still does not have an official advising capacity. Advising has never been something “Big Army” has been all that interested in doing (it has traditionally been viewed as a career drag) and moving officers and NCOs into these roles would mean moving them out of other units. By contrast, all the muss and fuss can instead be handed off to a company to handle.
But just because a company can do the job, doesn’t always mean it should. Advising the Iraqi Army has been determined by our national leadership as a task that is essential to our successful war effort. We should treat it that way in how the job is executed.
Now, numerous bloggers have mentioned the Advisory Corps (Westhawk has given it a plug on both his posts), but I can't recall Singer getting involved before. This is yet another indication that the Army Advisory Corps is gaining traction, and a sign that others are beginning to recognize the hole that the AAC will attempt to fill. It seems Nagl will get his Corps sooner, rather than later.
Thursday, May 8, 2008
An Unfortunate Comparison, Part Deux
...And Lebanon teeters on the brink of civil war. Who would have guessed?
The ability of Hezbollah to create a "state-within-a-state" has progressed to the point where even the headless Lebanese government is forced to confront it. The government attempts to reign in Hezbollah's organization and infrastructure are simply too little, too late...the group has had years to entrench itself psychologically and physically. The paralytic state of Lebanese politics has only weakened the central government's ability to deal with a force that is arguably the most cohesive political unit in the country. The rest of the Middle East may not a renewed ethnosectarian conflict in Lebanon, but unless the government backs down (and it would be the government, not Hezbollah, that blinks), that's exactly what's going to happen
The ability of Hezbollah to create a "state-within-a-state" has progressed to the point where even the headless Lebanese government is forced to confront it. The government attempts to reign in Hezbollah's organization and infrastructure are simply too little, too late...the group has had years to entrench itself psychologically and physically. The paralytic state of Lebanese politics has only weakened the central government's ability to deal with a force that is arguably the most cohesive political unit in the country. The rest of the Middle East may not a renewed ethnosectarian conflict in Lebanon, but unless the government backs down (and it would be the government, not Hezbollah, that blinks), that's exactly what's going to happen
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