As the LCS program slogs forward, Information Dissemination continues its coverage by offering fiscal and strategic perspectives on the program's evolution. Much of this, particularly the strategic debate, has been presented before, but these latest posts expand on both the theory of naval strategy in relation to LCS and the true costs of the platforms.
I have relatively little to contribute further to this discussion; I laid out my preferred alternative to LCS a few months back. However, I have noticed that the comparisons between the OHP FFG-7 class and the LCS are growing. This is largely sensible, as the FFG-7 is one of several classes that the LCS will replace, but one important difference is being overlooked. The FFG-7 was intended to operate in low and medium threat environments, but it was also regarded as the more expendable part of a low-high mix of combatants. The strategic and political environment has now changed to the point where American leaders and the public will not tolerate the loss of any vessel, particularly $550 million hulls, unless the US is confronted with a massive act of foreign aggression. The US version of the LCS is not equipped to defend itself against Corbett's "cruisers", and those cruisers are no longer limited to major powers. As it stands now, it is likely that admirals will treat the LCS as a glorified minesweeper and light transport - roles in which it should excel, but a limitation which will undermine the rationale for the program itself. The LCS is not a cruiser, cannot fight like a cruiser, but the loss of one will be considered as serious as the loss of a cruiser. That is a problem, one that noone seems motivated to address.
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Came across your blog through Navy Clips newsletter, and really enjoyed this post. Like you I think the cost of modern warships is shocking and I fear that the few we are able to afford will make the Admirals more cautious when faced with a threat to this country. I keep thinking the battle of Jutland where the Germans were allowed to get away because Jellicoe wouldn't risk his big ships.
We need affordable and even expendable warships which are far less than the 1/2 billion and multi-billion warships we now purchase. I am thinking if we dramatically shrink the size of warships, for example an LCS at about 1000 tons or even less, the designers might think more outside the box and keep such unique vessels reduced in price but still viable in modern warfare. Its either that of the impending "200 ship navy".
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