Yesterday it became official: David Petraeus is no longer the commander of the multinational forces in Iraq. Amidst much valediction, command was transferred to Ray Odierno, the "reeducated" (in the Chinese sense) general who had been serving as Petraeus's deputy.
With Petraeus soon to be CINC of CENTCOM, it seems as good a time as any to take preliminary stock of his time at the face of the war effort. While it is far too early to assess the long-term success or failure of the Petraeus tenure in Baghdad, it is likely that his legacy will be defined by his previous 20 months of service. Barring a major unforseen crisis, Petraeus's time at CENTCOM will be overshadowed by his efforts in Iraq. Given that, where will Petraeus rank in the pantheon of US generals?
Since World War Two, there have been two distinct sets of well-known general officers - those that interject themselves into politics, and those who abstain. The former group includes Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower, Maxwell Taylor, and Colin Powell. All of these men became major public figures outside of military circles. The purist camp consists of men like Omar Bradley, Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Matthew Ridgway, and William Westmoreland, men who dealt with the impact of politics on their profession yet refrained from becoming political figures themselves. Since the Vietnam War, though, the general ranks have become so politicized that flag officers have only appeared in the public eye as politically-oriented figures. Colin Powell's career (and the less significant impact of officers like Wesley Clark) exemplifies this trend. By comparison, purist generals such as Norman Schwarzkopf and Anthony Zinni (at least before retirement) have had considerably less staying power.
It is ironic, then, that David Petraeus would gain ascendancy during the partisan and intensely political Bush Administration. As a field commander, Petraeus has dominated public attention in a way not seen since Westmoreland, although the Petraeus philosophy owes much more to Westmoreland's less high profile successor, Creighton Abrams. Throughout his tenure at MNF-I, Petraeus managed to retain his credibility and avoid being tarred as a Bush lackey. Despite intense pressure at all sides, Petraeus remained first and foremost a commander and Army leader. He is neither a purist nor a political creature but a general mindful of the political context in which he operates. It is a trait that other flag officers would do well to emulate.
It will be interesting to watch the next and perhaps last phase of Petraeus's career. CENTCOM has proven to be a difficult assignment since its creation: Franks and Abizaid were undone by Iraq, the command of Schwarzkopf has lost much of its luster since 1991, and Admiral Fallon found himself run out of town. Petraeus will need every ounce of his political savvy to keep his footing and not become a victim of Washington or Pentagon politics. Unless Petraeus decides to join the civilian side of the Executive Branch, this post will likely be his last - but after all of his efforts, it would be only fitting for him to leave on his own terms.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Pakistani Outrage and the Imperative of Sovereign Control
JCS Chairman Mike Mullen was suddenly dispatched to Pakistan yesterday to deal with the uproar created by news of a US incursion into Pakistani territory. The new Pakistani administration continues to assert its own rights and seems eager to be seen as facing down the US, although military professionals on both sides would probably prefer to keep any chance encounters off the front page. Both Pakistani and international politicians have emphasized the importance of respecting Pakistani sovereignty, which leads us to an interesting gap in international theory.
Can nations reasonably expect the world to accept their sovereignty over areas they cannot actually control? The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan has never fully submitted to national authority, and has been at blows with federal forces more often than not. This is the standard excuse for the inability to track down and capture key Al Qaeda figures. If internal forces do not respect the authority of Islamabad in the NWFP, then why should international law force external actors to respect that authority?
The answer to that question is fairly obvious: to prevent the type of foreign intervention that was demonstrated most recently in Georgia. But Pakistan is a special case, in that it contains a universally acknowledged international threat lodged within its borders. It is difficult to imagine a region more conducive to terrorist concealment than the NWFP, and if Al Qaeda could be dislodged from its stronghold, it would be severely, perhaps fatally weakened as an organization (although it would certainly live on as a source of guidance and inspiration). The unique value of the NWFP as a terrorist redoubt cannot be reproduced, and the incentive for the international community to secure that redoubt is immense. So why does international respect for sovereignty persist in this case?
International Law is yet to confront the reality that the NWFP and Afghanistan do not conform to the Westphalian state system that dictates every other aspect of international relations. The concept of sovereignty is difficult to grasp when that mantle is cast over areas that are de jure autonomous regions and de facto independent polities. It is time to account for actors within these actors that pose a threat, not just to the regime that claims sovereignty over the area or its neighbors, but to the international community as a whole.
[Edit: The US incursions actually took place in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), not the NWFP. I still stand by everything stated above, although FATA is even further from government control than the NWFP]
Can nations reasonably expect the world to accept their sovereignty over areas they cannot actually control? The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan has never fully submitted to national authority, and has been at blows with federal forces more often than not. This is the standard excuse for the inability to track down and capture key Al Qaeda figures. If internal forces do not respect the authority of Islamabad in the NWFP, then why should international law force external actors to respect that authority?
The answer to that question is fairly obvious: to prevent the type of foreign intervention that was demonstrated most recently in Georgia. But Pakistan is a special case, in that it contains a universally acknowledged international threat lodged within its borders. It is difficult to imagine a region more conducive to terrorist concealment than the NWFP, and if Al Qaeda could be dislodged from its stronghold, it would be severely, perhaps fatally weakened as an organization (although it would certainly live on as a source of guidance and inspiration). The unique value of the NWFP as a terrorist redoubt cannot be reproduced, and the incentive for the international community to secure that redoubt is immense. So why does international respect for sovereignty persist in this case?
International Law is yet to confront the reality that the NWFP and Afghanistan do not conform to the Westphalian state system that dictates every other aspect of international relations. The concept of sovereignty is difficult to grasp when that mantle is cast over areas that are de jure autonomous regions and de facto independent polities. It is time to account for actors within these actors that pose a threat, not just to the regime that claims sovereignty over the area or its neighbors, but to the international community as a whole.
[Edit: The US incursions actually took place in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), not the NWFP. I still stand by everything stated above, although FATA is even further from government control than the NWFP]
More LCS Debates
As the LCS program slogs forward, Information Dissemination continues its coverage by offering fiscal and strategic perspectives on the program's evolution. Much of this, particularly the strategic debate, has been presented before, but these latest posts expand on both the theory of naval strategy in relation to LCS and the true costs of the platforms.
I have relatively little to contribute further to this discussion; I laid out my preferred alternative to LCS a few months back. However, I have noticed that the comparisons between the OHP FFG-7 class and the LCS are growing. This is largely sensible, as the FFG-7 is one of several classes that the LCS will replace, but one important difference is being overlooked. The FFG-7 was intended to operate in low and medium threat environments, but it was also regarded as the more expendable part of a low-high mix of combatants. The strategic and political environment has now changed to the point where American leaders and the public will not tolerate the loss of any vessel, particularly $550 million hulls, unless the US is confronted with a massive act of foreign aggression. The US version of the LCS is not equipped to defend itself against Corbett's "cruisers", and those cruisers are no longer limited to major powers. As it stands now, it is likely that admirals will treat the LCS as a glorified minesweeper and light transport - roles in which it should excel, but a limitation which will undermine the rationale for the program itself. The LCS is not a cruiser, cannot fight like a cruiser, but the loss of one will be considered as serious as the loss of a cruiser. That is a problem, one that noone seems motivated to address.
I have relatively little to contribute further to this discussion; I laid out my preferred alternative to LCS a few months back. However, I have noticed that the comparisons between the OHP FFG-7 class and the LCS are growing. This is largely sensible, as the FFG-7 is one of several classes that the LCS will replace, but one important difference is being overlooked. The FFG-7 was intended to operate in low and medium threat environments, but it was also regarded as the more expendable part of a low-high mix of combatants. The strategic and political environment has now changed to the point where American leaders and the public will not tolerate the loss of any vessel, particularly $550 million hulls, unless the US is confronted with a massive act of foreign aggression. The US version of the LCS is not equipped to defend itself against Corbett's "cruisers", and those cruisers are no longer limited to major powers. As it stands now, it is likely that admirals will treat the LCS as a glorified minesweeper and light transport - roles in which it should excel, but a limitation which will undermine the rationale for the program itself. The LCS is not a cruiser, cannot fight like a cruiser, but the loss of one will be considered as serious as the loss of a cruiser. That is a problem, one that noone seems motivated to address.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Boeing puts profits over patriotism
It's official - the Air Force has caved on the KC-X contract it had awarded this spring. Boeing's congressional cronies came through and now the whole issue will be punted to the next administration. So now, having won the contract through ethical misconduct and lost it through a lack of competitive quality, Boeing will get an incredible third chance at a pot of gold worth a potential $100 billion.
Why this company pretends to be American, I don't know. On a critical contract to address the needs of an often overlooked segment of American military power, Boeing shamelessly played the domestic employment card to have its way. Instead of moving forward to replace a fleet of tankers that were built during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the Pentagon will start from scratch. Perhaps yesterday's news was inevitable, but it is disappointing nonetheless.
This incident can be traced to an innate distrust of foreign military contractors, but Boeing's actions have shown that domestic contractors are no more concerned with the national interest than their foreign counterparts. More distressingly, the tanker drama has shown the moral bankruptcy of congress on the subject of military reform. The denizens of the Pentagon had the courage to place patriotism over corporate profit, but an unscrupulous legislative branch intervened on behalf of their aerospace buddies. The only question is: how many KC-135s will be eligible for Social Security benefits by the time their replacements are built?
Seven years later, and its business as usual.
(On a somewhat happier note, Saturday Night Live returns this week after a strike-shortened previous season. I want to make a personal plea for Tina Fey's return as Republican VP candidate Sarah Palin. The pairing is simply too perfect to pass up, and we desperately need Fey's dry, acerbic wit. She'll have a field day with a pro-life, pro-gun, pro-hockey mother of five. Bring back Fey! She has been missed.)
Why this company pretends to be American, I don't know. On a critical contract to address the needs of an often overlooked segment of American military power, Boeing shamelessly played the domestic employment card to have its way. Instead of moving forward to replace a fleet of tankers that were built during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the Pentagon will start from scratch. Perhaps yesterday's news was inevitable, but it is disappointing nonetheless.
This incident can be traced to an innate distrust of foreign military contractors, but Boeing's actions have shown that domestic contractors are no more concerned with the national interest than their foreign counterparts. More distressingly, the tanker drama has shown the moral bankruptcy of congress on the subject of military reform. The denizens of the Pentagon had the courage to place patriotism over corporate profit, but an unscrupulous legislative branch intervened on behalf of their aerospace buddies. The only question is: how many KC-135s will be eligible for Social Security benefits by the time their replacements are built?
Seven years later, and its business as usual.
(On a somewhat happier note, Saturday Night Live returns this week after a strike-shortened previous season. I want to make a personal plea for Tina Fey's return as Republican VP candidate Sarah Palin. The pairing is simply too perfect to pass up, and we desperately need Fey's dry, acerbic wit. She'll have a field day with a pro-life, pro-gun, pro-hockey mother of five. Bring back Fey! She has been missed.)
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
Georgia's woes and the wrath of the Daily Telegraph
By now, a lot of ink has been spilled over the Georgia crisis, but we are just beginning to see the long-term effects of the Russian incursion. The Daily Telegraph unloaded a strongly worded editorial today that offered both a skeptical view of the current negotiations and some sweeping proclamations about the state of world politics:
We should be sceptical that the meeting, in which Mr Sarkozy pressed for a Russian withdrawal from Georgia, will be a lasting success: the last time the French president negotiated with the Russians, he fell victim to Kremlin realpolitik. The Russians ignored the commitment to withdraw, citing technicalities in the agreement.
We should also be concerned, moreover, that we are leaving a vital part of Britain's foreign (and energy security) policy to Mr Sarkozy; he may have many virtues but his foreign policy interests are not necessarily identical to our own.
Who knows what Franco-Russian deals he may be contemplating? From the EU's perspective, these negotiations are less about Georgia and more about seeking to build credibility as an international power broker.
Yet, without an army, navy and airforce, aggressors are never going to take an EU foreign policy seriously; and, while the europhiles would see that as an argument for an EU military arm, that would be a recipe for factionalism.
There will be a temptation, after the inevitable European humiliation, to pass the buck to other supranational institutions such as the G8 and the United Nations. This would be a mistake.
The world has returned to 19th Century-style great power struggles between nation states, uninhibited by international institutions. With a risk that Russian will impose its will on other neighbours such as Ukraine in the future, we cannot rely on impotent organisations to keep the peace.
Instead, it requires politicians here and the United States to wake up to their own national interests and take a tough line against Russian expansionism, which will be discouraged not by soft power but by strength.
Beyond the slightly paranoid fears about French double-dealing, the editorial betrays a conservative belief that Russia's actions have shown the irrelevance of international controls and the ephemeral nature of the post-Cold War cooperative atmosphere. The conviction that Russia cannot be reasoned with or politely diverted from its aims points to a return to Cold War thinking. The thrust of the editorial is that Europe has placed too much faith in its political and economic collective without investing in the hard power resources to rebuff Russia's regional imperialism. In the face of Russia's efforts to reassert its traditional sphere of influence encompassing recalcitrant polities such as Georgia and Ukraine, the Europeans have found themselves over the literal and metaphorical barrel (of oil). Now that Georgia's section of the BTC pipeline is vulnerable to further Russian intervention, Russia's hand is even stronger.
Have we indeed returned to the 19th century? I refuse to believe that the situation is so simple as that. Even if the EU and UN are powerless, Russia's power is entirely dependent on the price of energy and the willingness of multi-nationals to do business with an unstable and corrupt regime. In twenty or thirty years, alternative energy sources might relegate Russia to second-rate status yet again. Until then, we may have to consider a piece of history that the Daily Telegraph did not mention. I'm sure there are a few copies of "Article X" floating around, just waiting to be updated for a xenophobic petro-state.
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
A "Surface SSK" for the US Navy
There's no shortage of hand-wringing going on with regards to the future of the US navy. While last year's Maritime Strategy has been accepted as a worthy, if flawed, statement of naval goals for the near future, the Navy's leadership and shipbuilding plans have been savaged by critics.
The greatest source of frustration for many naval bloggers is the failure to develop smaller ships to complement the navy's preponderance in large surface combatants. Perhaps the best articulation of this shortfall was provided by Information Dissemination back in February. The LCS program was supposed to provide a semblance of balance between large combatants and smaller vessels, but spiraling costs and mission controversy have led many to question the feasibility of the LCS concept and search for other ship designs that could work within a more refined US naval strategy.
I agree with most of the criticisms of the LCS. The ships being developed are underarmed, have questionable range, and rely on a modular system that is operationally troublesome and unproven. Significantly, "international" versions of the LCS with additional armament have generated considerable foreign interest, but the heavily modularized US version has been a non-starter in the export market.
There are plenty of good, modern frigate/corvette designs available on the world market, in addition to the international versions of the LCS. I won't spend much time discussing precisely what class of ship the US should adopt or develop, but there is a pressing need for a "utility infielder", capable of deploying with a carrier group and screening the battle force. Something in between 3000 and 6000 tons, with speed comparable to modern cruisers and destroyers (none of this 50 knot fantasy), 16-32 VLS, and the ability to instantly switch roles from AAW to ASuW to ASW. Versatility should emphasized without succumbing to the allure of immature technologies and complicated logistics.
Unfortunately, a utility infielder will be too large and expensive for some scenarios, especially environments with numerous small submarines and fast attack craft. From the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to the PLAN, navies with diverse origins and interest have embraced the use of small platforms to trouble larger, more precious Western ships (Information Dissemination has dubbed the PLAN philosophy "Streetfighter with submarines"). These threats will likely be predominant for the next 15-20 years, so they merit a purpose-built ship to counter them.
Traditionally, the USN has preferred to hunt submarines with its own SSN fleet. However, , the proliferation of advanced non-nuclear submarines combined with the declining numbers of US submarines places that strategy in doubt. Additional US submarines are needed, but their numbers will never match that of their foreign counterparts. Also, submarines are a poor platform to combat small, fast surface craft. Something else is needed to neutralize the submarine threat while keeping FACs at bay.
A very interesting piece on the internet (and linked by Defense Industry Daily's coverage of the LCS) proposed an alternative to the LCS program. The main thrust of the article was that the modern submarine threat demanded a purpose-built craft that could, with the requisite support, sanitize operational theatres. This Diesel-Electric Corvette would have sharply reduced IR, radar, and acoustic signatures, making it an ideal platform to stalk surface or undersea targets. It would be, in effect, a "Surface SSK".
The original article used the Swedish Visby as a foundation for what an ideal corvette would look like. At this point, we must confront the issue of the corvette's size. For a defensive littoral corvette operating close to home, the Visby is perfectly suitable. However, as noted in a CSBA report on the LCS, the Danish Navy concluded that any ocean-going small craft suitable for expeditionary operations would need to be at least three times the size of the Visby (which is roughly 650 tons). Allowing for modest advances in seakeeping and endurance (and installing lower-speed, efficient engines), that points to a displacement range of 1500 - 2500 tons for any prospective design. Kockums was once working on a "Visby-Plus" with sufficient size; now that Thyssen-Grupp has taken over, it has its own designs. These are just starting points from a ship design standpoint, but they are oriented in the right direction.
How do you counter a ship that can sit off of a coastline, collecting intelligence and monitoring enemy movements, without being successfully targeted? How do you justify the amount of resources needed to hunt down such a ship, when the USN battlewagons are lurking further offshore? The beauty of the Surface SSK is that it is flexible enough to conduct missions beyond sub-hunting with very little in the way of hardware modifications and downtime. They have the potential to become part of twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy, the invisible partners to the 100-ft corvettes and large motherships that are being developed for low-intensity conflicts.
The greatest source of frustration for many naval bloggers is the failure to develop smaller ships to complement the navy's preponderance in large surface combatants. Perhaps the best articulation of this shortfall was provided by Information Dissemination back in February. The LCS program was supposed to provide a semblance of balance between large combatants and smaller vessels, but spiraling costs and mission controversy have led many to question the feasibility of the LCS concept and search for other ship designs that could work within a more refined US naval strategy.
I agree with most of the criticisms of the LCS. The ships being developed are underarmed, have questionable range, and rely on a modular system that is operationally troublesome and unproven. Significantly, "international" versions of the LCS with additional armament have generated considerable foreign interest, but the heavily modularized US version has been a non-starter in the export market.
There are plenty of good, modern frigate/corvette designs available on the world market, in addition to the international versions of the LCS. I won't spend much time discussing precisely what class of ship the US should adopt or develop, but there is a pressing need for a "utility infielder", capable of deploying with a carrier group and screening the battle force. Something in between 3000 and 6000 tons, with speed comparable to modern cruisers and destroyers (none of this 50 knot fantasy), 16-32 VLS, and the ability to instantly switch roles from AAW to ASuW to ASW. Versatility should emphasized without succumbing to the allure of immature technologies and complicated logistics.
Unfortunately, a utility infielder will be too large and expensive for some scenarios, especially environments with numerous small submarines and fast attack craft. From the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to the PLAN, navies with diverse origins and interest have embraced the use of small platforms to trouble larger, more precious Western ships (Information Dissemination has dubbed the PLAN philosophy "Streetfighter with submarines"). These threats will likely be predominant for the next 15-20 years, so they merit a purpose-built ship to counter them.
Traditionally, the USN has preferred to hunt submarines with its own SSN fleet. However, , the proliferation of advanced non-nuclear submarines combined with the declining numbers of US submarines places that strategy in doubt. Additional US submarines are needed, but their numbers will never match that of their foreign counterparts. Also, submarines are a poor platform to combat small, fast surface craft. Something else is needed to neutralize the submarine threat while keeping FACs at bay.
A very interesting piece on the internet (and linked by Defense Industry Daily's coverage of the LCS) proposed an alternative to the LCS program. The main thrust of the article was that the modern submarine threat demanded a purpose-built craft that could, with the requisite support, sanitize operational theatres. This Diesel-Electric Corvette would have sharply reduced IR, radar, and acoustic signatures, making it an ideal platform to stalk surface or undersea targets. It would be, in effect, a "Surface SSK".
The original article used the Swedish Visby as a foundation for what an ideal corvette would look like. At this point, we must confront the issue of the corvette's size. For a defensive littoral corvette operating close to home, the Visby is perfectly suitable. However, as noted in a CSBA report on the LCS, the Danish Navy concluded that any ocean-going small craft suitable for expeditionary operations would need to be at least three times the size of the Visby (which is roughly 650 tons). Allowing for modest advances in seakeeping and endurance (and installing lower-speed, efficient engines), that points to a displacement range of 1500 - 2500 tons for any prospective design. Kockums was once working on a "Visby-Plus" with sufficient size; now that Thyssen-Grupp has taken over, it has its own designs. These are just starting points from a ship design standpoint, but they are oriented in the right direction.
How do you counter a ship that can sit off of a coastline, collecting intelligence and monitoring enemy movements, without being successfully targeted? How do you justify the amount of resources needed to hunt down such a ship, when the USN battlewagons are lurking further offshore? The beauty of the Surface SSK is that it is flexible enough to conduct missions beyond sub-hunting with very little in the way of hardware modifications and downtime. They have the potential to become part of twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy, the invisible partners to the 100-ft corvettes and large motherships that are being developed for low-intensity conflicts.
Monday, June 16, 2008
The Meme of Seven
Galrahn came calling, so here goes:
Here are the rules:
1. Link to your tagger and post these rules on your blog.
2. Share 7 facts about yourself on your blog, some random, some weird.
3. Tag 7 people at the end of your post by leaving their names as well as links to their blogs.
4. Let them know they are tagged by leaving a comment on their blog.
5. Present an image of martial discord something more relevant to my blog from whatever period or situation you’d like.
To the facts we go...
1) Like the person who tagged me, I too was voted most likely to succeed in high school, although my personality was certainly not an asset. My cynicism was (and still is) legendary.
2) I briefly achieved local fame as the high school student who aced both college entrance exams (SAT and ACT). Yale still rejected my application, although they accepted a double legacy and a football player from my school (this slight has not been forgiven).
3) I knew the difference between a T-62 MBT and a T-72 by age ten. I finished Samuel Eliot Morrison's history of WW2 naval operations at age eleven.
4) I hail from the same state which produced Abu Muqawama (aka Andrew Exum).
5) Soccer is in my blood. My father was a coach, I played as a youth, and I have been a licensed referee for eight years. I have often thought about getting a coaching license (usually after officiating woefully coached squads). Right now I am obsessively following Euro 2008 and supporting the teams which play with imagination and zeal (mostly Holland and Spain).
6)I write sporadic (and usually unfinished) pieces of fiction and creative non-fiction. I also read a lot of twentieth century American authors, including Joseph Heller, Saul Bellow, Hemingway, and Vonnegut. I can't stand feminist and postmodern literary criticism, and I've written academic papers refuting those perspectives.
7) Although I am politically unaligned, I live in one of the most Republican congressional districts in the country. How Republican, you might ask? When Tennessee finally seceded from the union, my region of the state almost seceded from Tennessee. My district has had four years of Democratic leadership since the Civil War.
And now, the tags...
Armchair Generalist
Westhawk
The Strategist
Blog Them Out of the Stone Age
Peter Coates
CDR Salamander (who I discovered through Galrahn's frequent references)
Ghosts of Alexander
I couldn't find a topical picture to include, but since this blog owes its existence to the senseless destruction of human life and property, I thought I'd include the picture below. The Palestinian boy being shielded by his father was killed shortly after the picture was taken. It is one of the defining modern images of the Palestinian conflict and a striking metaphor for the masses of humanity trapped between belligerent parties.
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