Showing posts with label shipbuilding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label shipbuilding. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

A "Surface SSK" for the US Navy

There's no shortage of hand-wringing going on with regards to the future of the US navy. While last year's Maritime Strategy has been accepted as a worthy, if flawed, statement of naval goals for the near future, the Navy's leadership and shipbuilding plans have been savaged by critics.

The greatest source of frustration for many naval bloggers is the failure to develop smaller ships to complement the navy's preponderance in large surface combatants. Perhaps the best articulation of this shortfall was provided by Information Dissemination back in February. The LCS program was supposed to provide a semblance of balance between large combatants and smaller vessels, but spiraling costs and mission controversy have led many to question the feasibility of the LCS concept and search for other ship designs that could work within a more refined US naval strategy.

I agree with most of the criticisms of the LCS. The ships being developed are underarmed, have questionable range, and rely on a modular system that is operationally troublesome and unproven. Significantly, "international" versions of the LCS with additional armament have generated considerable foreign interest, but the heavily modularized US version has been a non-starter in the export market.

There are plenty of good, modern frigate/corvette designs available on the world market, in addition to the international versions of the LCS. I won't spend much time discussing precisely what class of ship the US should adopt or develop, but there is a pressing need for a "utility infielder", capable of deploying with a carrier group and screening the battle force. Something in between 3000 and 6000 tons, with speed comparable to modern cruisers and destroyers (none of this 50 knot fantasy), 16-32 VLS, and the ability to instantly switch roles from AAW to ASuW to ASW. Versatility should emphasized without succumbing to the allure of immature technologies and complicated logistics.

Unfortunately, a utility infielder will be too large and expensive for some scenarios, especially environments with numerous small submarines and fast attack craft. From the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to the PLAN, navies with diverse origins and interest have embraced the use of small platforms to trouble larger, more precious Western ships (Information Dissemination has dubbed the PLAN philosophy "Streetfighter with submarines"). These threats will likely be predominant for the next 15-20 years, so they merit a purpose-built ship to counter them.

Traditionally, the USN has preferred to hunt submarines with its own SSN fleet. However, , the proliferation of advanced non-nuclear submarines combined with the declining numbers of US submarines places that strategy in doubt. Additional US submarines are needed, but their numbers will never match that of their foreign counterparts. Also, submarines are a poor platform to combat small, fast surface craft. Something else is needed to neutralize the submarine threat while keeping FACs at bay.

A very interesting piece on the internet (and linked by Defense Industry Daily's coverage of the LCS) proposed an alternative to the LCS program. The main thrust of the article was that the modern submarine threat demanded a purpose-built craft that could, with the requisite support, sanitize operational theatres. This Diesel-Electric Corvette would have sharply reduced IR, radar, and acoustic signatures, making it an ideal platform to stalk surface or undersea targets. It would be, in effect, a "Surface SSK".

The original article used the Swedish Visby as a foundation for what an ideal corvette would look like. At this point, we must confront the issue of the corvette's size. For a defensive littoral corvette operating close to home, the Visby is perfectly suitable. However, as noted in a CSBA report on the LCS, the Danish Navy concluded that any ocean-going small craft suitable for expeditionary operations would need to be at least three times the size of the Visby (which is roughly 650 tons). Allowing for modest advances in seakeeping and endurance (and installing lower-speed, efficient engines), that points to a displacement range of 1500 - 2500 tons for any prospective design. Kockums was once working on a "Visby-Plus" with sufficient size; now that Thyssen-Grupp has taken over, it has its own designs. These are just starting points from a ship design standpoint, but they are oriented in the right direction.

How do you counter a ship that can sit off of a coastline, collecting intelligence and monitoring enemy movements, without being successfully targeted? How do you justify the amount of resources needed to hunt down such a ship, when the USN battlewagons are lurking further offshore? The beauty of the Surface SSK is that it is flexible enough to conduct missions beyond sub-hunting with very little in the way of hardware modifications and downtime. They have the potential to become part of twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy, the invisible partners to the 100-ft corvettes and large motherships that are being developed for low-intensity conflicts.