Slate Gets Myopic on Defense

Some people never learn to take the long view. Over at Slate, Fred Kaplan has produced an extremely skeptical analysis of the Defense Department's proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2009. While Kaplan makes a point of noting the true magnitude of defense spending, he zeros in on one particular category:

But let's delve into the Pentagon's base line figure—the $515.4 billion that has nothing directly to do with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What's in there? Do the U.S. armed forces really need that much for the everyday maintenance of national security?About a quarter of that sum—$125.2 billion—is for personnel costs: understandable. Another third—$180 billion—is for operations and maintenance of equipment (a bit more mysterious, since this is apart from the O&M costs brought on by the war). But a larger sum still—$184 billion—is for what the Pentagon calls "major weapons systems."


Notice the use of quotation marks. In Pentagon-speak, there's nothing remotely confusing about the phrase "major weapons spending." Kaplan goes on to elaborate:

This includes $45.6 billion for military aircraft, including $6.7 billion to buy 16 more F-35 stealth planes. The F-35 is still in its early stages; the Pentagon has, to date, spent only about one-tenth of what it estimates to be a $300 billion program. It's not too late to ask if we need such a costly, sophisticated fighter jet, given that air-to-air combat is not likely to be a major element of future wars and, to the extent that it might be, we're way ahead—in numbers and technology—of any prospective foe. Or let's accept the proposition that China's air force is going to be a formidable rival by the year 2020: Do we need to tear full-speed ahead on the F-35 now? Could we slow the program down and see how things shape up?

Wait a minute, "early stages"? The FY 2009 budget includes money for low-rate initial production of the F-35A. That's well beyond the prototype stage and a precursor to delivery of the first operational aircraft. This project has been in the works for over a decade, and NOW Kaplan wants to pull the plug?

Right now, the Initial Operation Capability for the F-35 variants is estimated to be 2012-13. That leaves about seven years for the services to work out the glitches and be comfortable with the new system. These projects always have teething problems. As it is, we should be able to have confident in our new generation of fighters when 2020 rolls around. To slow the program down would be to saddle our airmen with untested platforms at a critical point in the global security environment. As for the idea that the PLAAF won't be a rival by 2020, Kaplan does nothing to present a serious argument and the strength of China's military modernization program is well documented. At a time when our existing front-line fighters are literally falling out of the sky, it is imperative that we press ahead with new purchases.

Rest assured, though, that Kaplan does not just single out the Air Force:

The budget also allots $16.9 billion for Navy shipbuilding, including $4.2 billion for a new aircraft carrier, $3.2 billion for a new DDG-1000 destroyer, and $3.6 billion for a new Virginia-class submarine. (The Navy is also pushing up, from 2012 to 2011, the year when it starts to build two of these subs annually, instead of one.) Again, where's the imminent danger, what's the rush?

And there is $3.6 billion for continued research and development into the Army's trouble-ridden Future Combat Systems program. (According to the Pentagon's budget documents, the estimated "initial deployment" for this system has now slipped to 2015, and its projected cost has risen to $160 billion—second only to the F-35 in the list of most expensive programs. Only about $20 billion has been spent so far; it's not too late to bite the bullet.)

Once again, Kaplan seems completely ignorant of future threats and the procurement challenges that face each service. With the proliferation of next-generation AIP diesel submarines and the navy's desperation for a new class of destroyers, delaying these programs is simply not an option. Aircraft carriers, meanwhile, remain the navy's most versatile platform and the ship class which sets the USN apart from its foreign counterparts. As for the FCS, the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the need for a new network-based system to rapidly disseminate information to the soldier in the field. While the program may be reviewed and modified, simply abandoning it would leave the army with nothing on the shelf. If nothing else FCS is providing valuable technological expertise that might lead to at least an evolutionary, if not revolutionary change for the US warfighter.

At the end of his critique, Kaplan concedes that the US can afford the current budget, but in the same breadth he questions the need for such expenditure. Given the fluid nature of warfare and the long lead time on these "major weapons systems", it is astonishing that any pundit could suggest we scrap our current programs simply because of the perceived lack of an immediate threat. Unless our policymakers can obtain perfect intelligence about foreign threats as they materialize (and here the recent track record is not encouraging), we cannot wait to be confronted by fully prepared enemies who will take advantage of our indecision. The mere possession of advanced weapons systems and publicity of their development may deter potential rivals from challenging the United States. The lack of such systems, conversely, can be (correctly) interpreted as a lack of long range commitment and willpower.

Perhaps it shouldn't be a surprise that Kaplan ignores these realities. After all, he once advised the former congressmen Les Aspin, who went on to have a questionable record as Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton. The neglect of military procurement and maintenance in the 1990's is largely responsible for the procurement gap the DoD is confronting today. But with all the focus on the day-to-day demands of the combat theatres, long-term force planning has once again suffered from a lack of serious attention. Hopefully Congress will look beyond its obsession with Iraq and starting working on the requirements of 2020 today, not tomorrow.