Chicagoland COIN

Americans have a deep-seated fear of involving the military in public life. In a time when even recruiters for a volunteer military are targeted by domestic protesters, it is difficult to contemplate importing concepts and techniques from a military involved in an unpopular occupation of a foreign country. The disjunct between the military and the civilian population has never been greater, with consequences for both civil-military relations and the health of American society.

During the 2000 election, the Bush campaign renounced "nation-building" as a role for the US military. The results of the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the US to reluctantly shoulder the responsibility of (re)building those nations, and the weaknesses of national governments throughout the world will dictate future requirements for a robust nation-building capability. Questions are being asked, particularly about the health of the foreign advising program. Bureaucratic recognition the institutional importance of advising is still in doubt, as is the military's ability to interface with both American and host nation civilian departments. A full spectrum nation-building program is still a ways off, but progress is being (fitfully) made.

A curious dynamic has developed through the military adventures of the twenty-first century. The armed services, long a xenophobic, conservative, and isolated community, have experienced a cultural enlightenment at the grassroots. An entire generation of soldiers and sailors (maybe even a few airmen) have been exposed to the diverse social and cultural landscape of the world beyond the American bubble. Servicemen have acquired painful firsthand knowledge of the expanded range of obstacles to national strength and unity, including social and economic inequities as well as political, ethnic, and sectarian fault lines. Having been forced to "reverse engineer" new governments and reinforce existing one, the armed forces are producing rudimentary public administrators as well as warfighters.

All of this stands in sharp contrast to the state of public administration at home. While critics have focused their attention on the qualities and shortcomings of high ranking officials, critical attention to state and local governance - the levels where the military has had the most success - has been lacking. Even the most rudimentary security concerns of domestic crime have been ignored during a wide-ranging presidential campaign. The GWOT/Long War has stripped away funds for social programs everywhere, from police officers to daycares. So far, America's foreign experiences have done nothing to improve its "domestic tranquility".

As writers such as John Robb have concluded, the true challenge facing modern societies is the construction of resilient communities, not national bureaucratic monstrosities. If we choose to view the United States as a patchwork of communities rather than a single nation, then our vulnerabilities become more apparent. The most dysfunctional and unstable communities hamstring our economic and social growth by perpetuating inequity and wasting national resources. These communities are concentrated in impoverished urban centers, and they demand a holistic solution that has not been forthcoming. Sporadic efforts to address urban poverty have produced mixed and sometimes counterproductive results.

These urban pockets are not ruled by the legitimate authorities that govern the rest of the country. Through a combination of inadequate resources, misplaced priorities, and corruption, state and local governments have relinquished their claims to troublesome urban enclaves. The abandoned communities have since become semi-sovereign entities, with their own power-sharing arrangements, economies, and social structures. Although individuals and organizations in these enclaves once subverted legitimate authority, it was ultimately he government's decision to abandon them. Therefore, the situation cannot be properly termed an insurgency. Technical definitions aside, enclaves exist within the nation's physical borders yet outside its legitimate authority. If the government is to reclaim the "ghetto center", it much learn from previous counterinsurgency experiences.

There are some striking similarities between American urban life and foreign environments. In Afghanistan, we have encountered the difficulties of confronting the drug trade and those who subsist on its revenue. We have also learned the value of infrastructure improvements in improving popular support and building community empowerment. In Iraq, we have grappled with the difficulty of transferring the loyalty of urban slums and providing basic government services. In both countries, we have been forced to work across massive social, cultural, and linguistic gaps.

Many of the characters we have dealt with during our occupations have counterparts in our domestic landscape. Comparisons have been made between the Sons of Iraq and the Italian mafia; many urban gangs have consciously adopted the business and organizational model of the mafia. The unique role of black preachers, who are active in the spheres of culture and politics as well as religion, is the closest approximation to the all-purpose influence exerted by certain Muslim religious figures. (are Jeremiah Wright and Muqtada al-Sadr really that far apart?)

If we make the required investment, our chances of success will be much greater in Chicago than in Baghdad. The cultural gap between the ghetto and suburbia is serious, but not as overwhelming as in Sadr city, and the linguistic barrier disappears entirely. Ethnic and sectarian tensions are significantly lower in America's cities, and organized alternatives to government control have not entrenched themselves. We will not have to contend with porous borders or a neighboring regime's patronage of rebellious elements, nor will we have to contend with overextended supply lines. Best of all, we will not face a nationalist insurgency bent on the eviction of foreign invaders.

We will not enter these enclaves without information. While the Pentagon struggles to drum up support for research in the social sciences, anthropologists and sociologists like Sudhir Venkatesh have produced a considerable body of work to form a foundation of knowledge. Even an elementary appreciation of the environment and primary actors will ease the learning curve and give officials a better delineation between what they know, what they don't know, and what they need to know.

To reclaim and reintegrate these urban enclaves, a massive influx of manpower and funds is paramount. One of the fundamental shortcomings of the urban center has been the lack of men to police it; by using recommended COIN force ratios, we can rectify that problem. The additional men will need to come from local and state police, backed by national guard units, preferably those with GWOT experience. Regular army units may be employed to train the new units, but under no circumstance should soldiers be employed in community security outside their home state. The primary task of these additional forces would be to deter gang activity and petty crime, with an eye towards separating the criminal command element from its lower ranks.

Once basic security has been established, infrastructural investments can begin. Three critical areas - housing, schools, and public transportation - should receive priority. Innovation should be encouraged in order to draw the best architects, urban planners, and administrators. Beyond infrastructure, however, human capital will have to be stockpiled, in the form of education and entrepreneurship. The vast underground economy will have to be regulated, with the illicit section gradually phased out as conditions permit and the legal unregulated businesses slowly integrated into the larger economy. The workforce will have to be gradually shaped to survive in the increasingly competitive global marketplace, without crippling the fragile social fabric of the communities.

The time frame for the transformation will need to be extensive, more in line with traditional COIN campaigns than election-driven four year cycles. Even with a full investment and sufficient political will, it may take a decade to secure gains made in these communities. The federal government will need to take the lead until reliable state and local partners can take over; the political machines of major cities have been one of the biggest historical obstacles to urban renewal.

With domestic COIN projects underway, government officials will have a testing ground for population-centric strategies with potential military applications, while the armed forces will have more time to maintain its proficiency in high intensity conflict. The benefits of stable communities will eventually pay for the considerable expenses of reclamation, creating a beneficial investment cycle. Most importantly, the experiences of Americans abroad will be leveraged to strengthen the nation at home. Chicagoland COIN can bridge the gap between America's nascent organizational capabilities and its lingering social needs. For millions of Americans, there is simply no alternative.

This is admittedly a very ambitious and far-reaching concept; expect this post to be edited and revisited in the near future. As always, constructive criticism is welcomed.